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Election Reform after the 
2000 Election 
Daniel]. Palazzolo 
The 2000 presidential election, marked by a crisis in the electoral process in 
the state of Florida and a challenge to the legitimacy of the election of 
George W. Bush, sparked a national debate on the quality of American de-
mocracy. The discussion quickly came to focus on "technical" problems as-
sociated with voting practices, including issues related to voter registration, 
ballot counting, ballot machinery, and election administration. Numerous 
commissions weighed in on these issues and made recommendations for re-
forming various aspects of the election system. 1 Congress debated election 
reform and ultimately passed the Help America Vote Act (HAVA) at the end 
of the 107th Session of Congress in 2002. Legislatures in all fifty states also 
took up the issue, and many states passed measures to improve election ad-
ministration. 
The proliferation of election reform across the United States raises several im-
portant issues for scholars, policy makers, and election reform analysts. The 
central focus of this volume is on questions dealing with the legislative re-
sponses to the 2000 election. What policy changes did the states and Congress 
enact in response to the 2000 election crisis in Florida? How can we explain the 
policy choices they made, or failed to make? What remains to be done to im-
prove elections in the United States? This book addresses these questions by ap-
plying a framework for explaining the type and degree of election law reform 
in the states between 2001 and 2003. A striking fact in this analysis is the wide 
variance in the responses of the states. State legislatures reacted differently to 
the 2000 election, in terms both of the degree and the pace of policy changes 
aimed to correct problems with their election systems. State performance in 
election reform can be classified under one of three broad categories: (1) states 
that took the initiative and engaged in major electoral reform well before the 
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passage of HAVA; (2) states that made incremental changes during the same pe-
riod; and (3) states that did little or nothing until being prompted, or forced to 
respond to federal legislation. Table 1 1 classifies all fifty states into these three 
categories of reform. 
The primary analytical and theoretical purpose of this research project is 
to explain the variation in election reform across the states after the 2000 
election with reference to a framework that includes the following key fac-
tors: (1) the threat of a close election, like the one experienced in Florida, (2) 
the capacity of election law in the state prior to 2000, (3) the state's political 
culture, ( 4) the partisan makeup of the legislative and executive branches, 
(5) the fiscal situation, (6) the influence of stakeholders-interested groups 
and election officials, (7) commission recommendations, (8) leadership, and 
Table 1.1. Classification of Fifty States by Three Patterns of 
Election Reform, 2001-2003 
Leading Major Reform States: 
Moved quickly after the 2000 election to enact comprehensive 
reforms, including funding to replace voting equipment 
Florida Georgia Maryland 
Incremental Change States: 
Gradually ena.cted modest but noteworthy improvements in 
election laws and in most cases lacked a consensus or did 
not find the need to adopt comprehensive reforms 
Alaska Mississippi Rhode Island 
Arkansas Missouri South Carolina 
California Montana South Dakota 
Colorado Nebraska Tennessee 
Idaho Nevada Texas 
Indiana New Jersey Utah 
Iowa New Mexico Vermont 
Kansas North Carolina Virginia 
Kentucky North Dakota Washington 
Louisiana Ohio West Virginia 
Maine Oklahoma Wisconsin 
Michigan Oregon Wyoming 
Minnesota Pennsylvania 
Late-Developing Reform States: 
Failed to adopt significant reforms until forced by the 
requirements of the Help America Vote Act (HAVA). 
Alabama 
Arizona 
Connecticut 
Delaware 
Hawaii 
Illinois 
Massachusetts 
New Hampshire 
New York 
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(9) external forces, such as the prospect-and ultimately the passage-of 
federal legislation. We use this framework to engage in systematic analysis of 
the reform politics in a sample of eleven states selected from the three cate-
gories in table 1.1. 2 The states of Florida, Georgia, and Maryland fall into the 
first category of major reform states; California, Idaho, Missouri, Pennsylva-
nia, and Virginia represent the second category of incremental change states; 
and Arizona, Illinois, and New York are instances of the third category of 
late-developing reform states. 
HOW MUCH REFORM? 
Within months after George Bush was finally certified the winner of Florida, 
recommendations for reforming elections emerged from various commis-
sions set up to study election systems and processes. A review of the com-
mission reports revealed a broad consensus in favor of several minimal re-
quirements in each state's electoral systems: statewide registration, 
provisional balloting, procedures that allow voters to correct their ballot, and 
standard procedures for conducting ballot recounts. Other aspects of the vot-
ing system that achieved consensus, but might be classified as enhancements 
that go beyond those requirements, included: up-to-date voting machinery 
and ballots, improved poll worker training, additional voter education, and 
better tactics for recruiting poll workers. Because some of those provisions 
are costly, even if state legislators believed that they are desirable, fiscal con-
straints might prohibit them from being enacted. Two other major issues-
establishing statewide recount procedures and standards, and restoring the 
right to vote for felons who have completed their sentences-also received 
widespread support among commissions, but these matters turned out to be 
more contentious among policymakers. Finally, commission reports them-
selves took different views on "reforms" relating to the role of the national 
government in election administration, no excuse early voting, military and 
overseas ballots, and accessibility for disabled voters (electionline.org 2001, 
16-17). 
In spite of the crisis that ensued from the 2000 presidential election, few 
states enacted immediate wholesale changes in election law. In a report pub-
lished a year after the 2000 election, Common Cause President Scott Harsh-
barger summed up the legislative activity of the states: "By looking at what's 
happened in state legislatures in the past year, you'd never know that we had 
a genuine electoral crisis on our hands just a year ago." He further noted: 
"Even with all the commission reports, academic studies, and investigative 
journalism on our electoral shortcomings, states have not responded with the 
kind of urgency that the problems demand. Many are simply waiting in vain 
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for financial help to anive from Washington without doing anything to pave 
the way" (Common Cause 2001). Thomas Mann of the Brookings Institution 
noted: "If you expected an immediate policy response after the debacle of 
November and December, you have been and will be disappointed" (Walsh 
2001, A02). As table 1.2 illustrates, states passed only a portion of the election 
reform bills introduced in the three years following the 2000 presidential elec-
tion. Presumably, gridlock at the state level was rooted in fiscal constraints, an-
ticipation over whether Congress would provide federal funding and man-
dates for state level action, and a lack of consensus among policy makers 
(electionline.org 2001, 8; Walsh 2001; Walsh and Baiz 2001). One academic 
study concluded that state legislators failed to reform election laws because in-
cumbent legislators had little incentive to change the status quo (Greco 2002). 
It may be that some of the expectations of rapid and universal actions were 
excessive, given the difficulty and complexity of the issues involved. While the 
general picture of limited initial reform is valid, there was considerable move-
ment afoot in a large number of states. A fifty state survey of legislative actions 
compiled by the Election Reform Information Project, published about one year 
after the 2000 election, found a mix of legislative changes. At the high end, 
Florida, Georgia, and Maryland enacted significant reforms in several aspects of 
their voting systems, including registration, ballot design, counting procedures, 
voter education, and voting equipment. Other states passed a variety of laws 
that made incremental improvements in voter registration (e.g., Colorado, Indi-
ana, Kansas, South Dakota, Texas, and Virginia), absentee or early voting (e.g., 
Nevada, New Mexico, and Virginia), voter assistance and poll place access (e.g., 
Nevada and New Mexico), voting equipment (e.g., Idaho, Texas, and Utah), 
vote counting (e.g., Maine, Nevada, Ohio, and Virginia), post-election recount 
procedures and standards (e.g., Colorado, Kansas, Texas, Virginia, and Wash-
ington), election day workers (e.g., Alabama), and voter education (e.g., Indi-
ana and New Jersey). Of course, some states, such as Arizona, Illinois, and New 
York, failed to make any significant changes in election law in the period im-
mediately following the 2000 election. Given the mix of responses among the 
states, it should be both interesting and instructive to inquire into why a few 
states immediately made major changes, why others only took incremental 
steps, and why others still failed to take action until Congress passed the HAVA. 
Table 1.2. Election Reform legislation in the States, 2001-2003 
Bills 2001 Bills 2002 Bills 2003 Bills 
Introduced 
Passed Into law 
*Does not include New York. 
2,088 
321 
1,555 
171 * 
1,692 
285* 
Source: National Conference of State Legislatures, "States Tackle Election Reform" (March 24, 
2003, and August 22, 2003) www.ncsl.org. 
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ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK FOR EXPLAINING ELECTION REFORM 
In the study of state-level elections, political scientists have focused much less 
attention on the formation of election law than on campaign finance, candi-
date recruitment, redistricting, and voting behavior, including the effects of 
ballot design, candidate status, early voting, motor voter, party control, fiscal 
conditions, and registration and voting laws.3 Since the 2000 election, politi-
cal scientists have conducted research on the effects of the butterfly ballot on 
voting errors in Palm Beach County, Florida (Wand 2001); the relationship be-
tween demographic and socioeconomic factors and the type of voting equip-
ment voters use (Knack and Kropf 2002); the causes of voided ballots (Tomz 
and Van Houweling 2003; Knack and Kropf 2003); and the inconsistencies in 
ballot design (Niemi and Herrnson 2003). Thus far there are no published ac-
ademic studies of the legislative aspects of election reform. 
Understanding how and why state legislators responded to the election 
crisis of 2000 is of practical interest to policymakers, administrators, and pol-
icy analysts. Explaining why the states responded in different ways has the-
oretical implications for the broad study of policy innovation.4 With these 
purposes in mind, it seemed helpful to develop a general framework, based 
on the major factors related to reform, to study the various patterns of elec-
tion law activity in the states. 
The framework permits analysis of election reform on three dimensions. 
First, it allows the testing of hypotheses for how each factor independently 
affects election reform. Second, by distinguishing between structural factors 
in place prior to or at the conclusion of the 2000 elections (i.e., the threat of 
a close election, the capacity of election law, political culture, and party con-
trol) and situational factors that took effect as the legislative process devel-
oped in each state (i.e., commission recommendations, the fiscal situation, 
stakeholders, leadership, and external events), it is possible to map the se-
quence of factors that affected the outcomes of the legislative process. The 
structural factors are antecedent variables whereas the situational factors are 
intervening variables in the sequence of the legislative process. Finally, the 
framework allows consideration of the combined effects of key factors on re-
form outcomes. The independent effect of any single variable may be either 
muted or enhanced by the presence of other factors listed in the framework. 
Structural Factors 
Threat of a Close Election 
The chaos that occurred in Florida, or something akin to it, could have hap-
pened in any state in an election that was as close and as crucial to the out-
come of the national decision. The closer the election, the higher are the stakes 
for the candidates and their parties. Unless all of the problems associated with 
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ensuring the accurate counting of every vote are eliminated, controversy is 
inevitable in close elections. Having said that, some states are clearly more sus-
ceptible than others to the danger of a Florida-style debacle. We begin with 
the hypothesis that, following Florida's lead, battleground states, in which the 
margin of victory for the winning candidates is close to 1 percent or less, are 
more likely than non-battleground states to seek immediate and perhaps ma-
jor changes in election administration.5 
Applying an objective standard is the most reliable way to measure the 
threat of a close election, though the perceptions of a threat, and the role of 
policymakers in framing the degree to which a close election might disrupt 
the electoral system, also came into play in some states. For example, Mary-
land falls into the category of major leading reform states, even though it is 
traditionally a state won comfortably by Democratic candidates in presiden-
tial elections and in statewide races. (The recent election of Republican gu-
bernatorial candidate Robert Ehrlich in 2002 is a notable exception.) An ob-
jective measure of the "closeness of the election" would not lead one to 
expect that Maryland would be a state inclined to comprehensive reform. 
But other factors-Maryland's progressive political culture and persuasive 
leadership-worked in this direction. 
Capacity of Election Law 
A state's potential for a disaster like the one experienced in Florida also 
depends on the capacity of election law. While human error will always cre-
ate the possibility of controversy in a close election, the chance of crisis and 
breakdown can be reduced by clear and uniform statewide recounting rules, 
comprehensible ballots, functioning machinery, an effective statewide regis-
tration system, and effective voter education, poll worker training, and poll 
worker recruitment tactics. The capacity of a state's election law should be 
an important factor in explaining the degree of legislative reform following 
the 2000 election. While no state could claim perfection, some states had 
greater capacity than others to administer elections. 
One way to measure the capacity of election law is to determine the ex-
tent to which a state meets the minimum requirements for elections agreed 
upon by various commissions-statewide registration, provisional balloting, 
procedures for allowing a person to change his/her vote, and standard pro-
cedures for conducting recounts. Florida had none of these in place prior to 
the 2000 presidential election. States that met one or more of these minimal 
requirements before the 2000 election would have greater capacity and 
would be less in need of reform than states like Florida.6 A state's residual 
vote rate and type(s) of voting equipment used by the voters in a state are 
also objective measures of capacity. States with relatively high rates of over-
votes and undervotes and large numbers of punch card machines are most 
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susceptible to voter error (see Ansolabehere and Stewart 2002; Knack and 
Kropf 2003).7 Those states should be more likely to engage in reform. 
Political Culture 
A state's political culture can affect the type and degree of election reform. 
King (1994) uses Elazar's (1984) concept of moralistic, individualist, and tra-
ditionalist political cultures and Sharkanshky's 0969) index of political cul-
ture to study the effects of political culture on registration rules and voting 
turnout in the states. King (1994, 118) hypothesizes that: "Apparently, some 
cultures value and promote citizen participation in the political process more 
than others." He finds that a state's political culture affects registration rules; 
states with more "traditionalist" cultures, where elites dominate the process 
and are more inclined to discourage voter participation, had more restrictive 
registration rules than "moralistic" states that value democratic governance 
and citizen participation. Thus, states with traditionalist and individualist cul-
tures are less likely to react immediately and adopt reforms that ease voter 
participation than states with moralistic cultures. 
Once again, other variables may enhance or diminish the effects of politi-
cal culture. States with traditional cultures may also have a history of poor 
election laws, and a limited capacity of election law, coupled with strong 
leadership and the threat of a close election might overcome cultural barri-
ers to reform. Georgia fits this pattern of election reform. Conversely, states 
that value voter participation and "good governance" might enact major 
changes in spite of the fact that they have good election laws in place and 
face no clear threat of a close election. Maryland fits this pattern of reform. 
Party Control 
Partisan control of the legislative and executive branches at the state level is 
a factor in explaining legislative output generally (Clarke 1998), though the ef-
fects vary by policy area (Bowling and Ferguson 2001). While many aspects of 
election law are nonpartisan, a few divide along party lines. As Cokie Roberts 
once put it, "Democrats want every vote to count; Republicans want every 
vote to count only once" (Ceaser and Busch 2001, 248). Republicans have 
been more likely to seek safeguards against fraud in voter registration and vot-
ing processes, while Democrats are more committed to ensuring equal access 
to polling places and recount rules that allow for consideration of the voter's 
intent (Seligson 2001). Democrats and their constituent groups opposed a pro-
vision in a United States Senate bill that required a photo ID at the polling 
place for voters who register by mail (Foerstel 2002). Republicans are also less 
likely to support restoring voting rights for felons who have completed their 
sentences. Democrats are generally more supportive of a stronger role for the 
10 Daniel J Palazzolo 
national government, including clear requirements, rather than mere guide-
lines, that states and localities must meet to comply with federal law (Calmes 
2001). Thus, a Republican-controlled legislature coupled with a Republican 
governor will have different priorities than a Democrat-controlled legislature 
and a Democratic governor. Legislation might be more likely to stall altogether 
in states where legislatures are nearly equally divided by party, or where one 
party controls only one of the two chambers (Clarke 1998), or perhaps where 
opposite parties control the legislative and executive branches. 
Once again, though, party control cannot be viewed in isolation from other 
factors; states with strong party competition may also be the most susceptible 
to a close statewide election. Major reform may also be less likely in state leg-
islatures dominated by one party, although the outcome of the process may 
also depend on which party is in control. States in which one party dominates 
the state government are almost by definition less likely to experience close 
elections, and legislators of the majority party will have few incentives to 
change election laws. Idaho, where the Republicans are firmly in control and 
have been for a long time, is perhaps a case in point. Such states are obviously 
less prone to partisan gridlock, but they are also more likely to make incre-
mental changes than to adopt major reforms. Party preferences also affect the 
behavior of the dominant party; states dominated by Democrats may seek ma-
jor reforms to solve problems associated with election administration. This was 
the case in Maryland, for example. Perhaps the states most likely to adopt ma-
jor reform, then, are those in which one party controls both the legislative and 
executive branches and where the legislative majority of either party has a 
comfortable margin of control, or where the Democratic Party dominates. 
Situational Factors 
Commissions 
In addition to numerous national commissions and task forces established 
to review election administration in the United States, twenty-one states 
formed commissions to study some aspect of election law or the election sys-
tem in their states.8 In general, commissions may be set up to solicit informa-
tion from experts, shift blame for unpopular decisions, or manage legislative 
workloads (Campbell 1998). In the case of election reform, commissions 
were mainly created to solicit information about the status of electoral sys-
tems and, especially in states with short legislative sessions, to manage work-
loads. The commissions were designed to develop a better understanding of 
the election problems within their respective states and, in most cases, to rec-
ommend improvements in the election system. To the extent that commis-
sions serve as a means of building consensus among interested parties, elec-
tion law changes are more likely in states that have commissions. 
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Fiscal Situation 
The state's fiscal situation is also likely to affect reform efforts. Election 
reform emerged just as the nation was entering a recession. After years of 
full coffers, many states experienced revenue shortages in 2001 and 2002, 
and costly election reforms had to compete with other spending priorities. 
Fiscal constraints may prohibit upgrades in registration systems, resources 
for new machinery, and funds for voter education or poll worker recruit-
ment, even if policymakers agree that they are worthy improvements. For 
the first two years of the reform period, fiscal constraints may also have 
caused states to wait until Congress and the president acted before invest-
ing new resources in the election system. On the other hand, in cases like 
Florida the political crisis was so severe and the public expectations for re-
form were so great that legislators overlooked the budgetary effects of new 
spending. 
Key Stakeholders: Interested Groups and Election Officials 
Organized groups are important participants in the legislative process. At 
the state level, group density influences the amount of legislation introduced 
and the ratio of introduced legislation enacted into law (Gray and Lowery 
1995), and group representation affects the lawmaking process (Bowling 
and Ferguson 2001). At the national level, civil rights groups have worked 
vigorously to expand voting rights and to impose federal requirements for 
ballot access and provisional voting. Group influence should accordingly be 
a factor in states where existing laws do not meet the expectations of civil 
rights groups. Several of the chapters in this volume assess the effects of re-
form advocacy groups, such as state chapters of the NAACP, Common Cause, 
and the League of Women Voters. 
In addition to organized interest groups, state-level agencies, local elec-
tion officials, and election reform experts actively participated in the elec-
tion reform process, either by serving on commissions or working directly 
with legislative committees. In many states, election officials played key 
roles in setting the reform agenda and providing valuable information about 
the election system to policy makers. The studies in this volume also reveal 
jurisdictional differences between state and local officials. As the drift of the 
reform debates moved toward greater uniformity across states, local offi-
cials were particularly concerned about losing control over election admin-
istration and about the potential financial costs of sharing the burden for 
new voting equipment. Thus, we begin with the hypothesis that states with 
centralized election systems may be able to reach consensus more easily 
than states with decentralized systems, where administrative authority is 
more dispersed.9 
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Leadership 
Leaders may also play important roles in moving legislation. In the area of 
election reform, several notable policy entrepreneurs seized the moment to 
advance changes in election law.1° For example, Cathy Cox, the Secretary of 
State in Georgia, made election reform a top priority and provided important 
leadership in her state. Secretary of State John Willis exercised similar lead-
ership in Maryland. States without active leaders, either from the executive 
branch or within the legislature, are less likely to achieve significant reform. 
In some cases, legislative leaders will seek to preserve the status quo in elec-
tion law. They may prefer to maintain, rather than reform, a system within 
which the majority party gained power. In general, because elected officials 
are more directly accountable to voters, strong leadership on election reform 
is more likely in states that elect executive officials to administer elections. 
External forces 
This study concentrates on different factors at the state level to account for 
the degree and type of electoral reform taken in response to the crisis of the 
2000 election. Yet two other forces from outside the states that came after the 
2000 election also affected the politics of election reform: (1) the prospect of 
federal legislation, including grants to states that upgrade their election sys-
tems and guidelines for spending those funds, and (2) the September 11, 
2001, terrorist attacks. 
Prior to the passage of the Help America Vote Act (HAVA), many states 
hesitated to enact reforms, as state legislators awaited legislative action from 
Washington. The enactment of the HAVA, with requirements and guidelines 
about how states should administer elections, gave state legislators more in-
centives to adopt election reforms, though their responses will vary. Reports 
conducted by electionline.org illustrate the variety of recommendations that 
will come from state planning bodies established in response to the HAVA 
(electionline.org 2003b and 2003c). As Robert Montjoy points out in chapter 
2, the HAVA offers a mix of requirements the states must meet to hold fed-
eral elections and incentives for them to reform election laws. The HAVA is 
likely to have a greater effect on states that made no significant changes in 
election law during the two years following the 2000 election; this was cer-
tainly true in Illinois and Arizona. 
The September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks indirectly affected election re-
form efforts. Whereas the 2000 election may have created a sense of urgency 
for states to deal with election problems, September 11 pushed new issues 
on to the states' agendas. The momentum behind election reform lost steam 
after September 11, as states turned more attention to security issues and 
economic problems related to the terrorist attacks. Though election reform 
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might have become less important for all states after the events of Septem-
ber 11, three states in this study-New York, Pennsylvania, and Virginia-
were among the most likely to turn their focus toward economic and 
security-related issues. 
APPLYING THE FRAMEWORK: A COMPARATIVE STATE ANALYSIS 
After an analysis of the role of HAYA in chapter 2, the authors in the next 
eleven chapters apply the framework of factors to each state. Through analy-
sis of reforms in three categories of states, a few general conclusions can be 
suggested. Legislators in major, leading reform states generally recognized 
the threat of a close election and/or a weak capacity to administer elections, 
were bolstered by bold commission recommendations, and were strongly 
led. In these states, a consensus quickly emerged among stakeholders that 
significant reforms were needed either to deal with a crisis or with a poten-
tial crisis. Of course, Florida passed the most comprehensive reforms in this 
group, and it is distinguishable from the other states by having actually ex-
perienced a crisis. Thus, public opinion in Florida, more than in any other 
state, "demanded" a major policy response. 
Legislators in incremental change states-Idaho, California, Missouri, 
Pennsylvania, and Virginia-either did not see the need for immediate, 
wholesale reforms because the capacity of their systems was generally 
sound and they did not face the threat of a close election, or they were de-
terred by economic conditions, partisan differences over key issues, or a 
lack of strong leadership. They did, however, make modest, steady im-
provements in various areas of the electoral process such as absentee bal-
loting, provisional voting, recount procedures, and registration guidelines.11 
Several factors required for major reform were absent in these states, 
though the conditions were suitable for modest changes in particular as-
pects of their electoral systems. 
In late-developing reform states (Arizona, Illinois, and New York), parti-
sanship, political culture, and a failure of leadership resulted in gridlock for 
the first two years following the 2000 presidential election. Yet, the HAYA re-
quires states to adopt specific reforms, if they have not already done so, in-
cluding: upgraded voting equipment, voter identification rules and provi-
sional ballots, and a statewide registration list. HAYA also creates incentives 
for policymakers to accept federal guidelines in exchange for federal funds to 
upgrade their voting systems. Arizona and Illinois responded affirmatively to 
the requirements and incentives of the HAYA, whereas New York has delayed 
passing legislation to bring the state's laws into compliance with the HAYA. 
In the concluding chapter, we draw general conclusions from our study of 
the individual states by a comparative analysis of the key factors that affect 
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reform and we use these results to look ahead at the next stage of election 
reform-implementation. We define the period of reform from the 2000 elec-
tion to the passage of the HAVA as the "end of the beginning" of the process 
of election reform, and we suggest how key factors in the framework are 
likely to affect the future of election reform in the states. 
NOTES 
1. Debates over election reform encompass a wide range of topics, including ma-
jor institutional issues like the Electoral College, campaign finance, and campaign 
practices. While those topics are worthy of close analysis, this study focuses on re-
forms associated with the administration of elections. For links to the major national 
commission reports, see www.electionline.org. See Crigler, Just, and McCaffery 
(2004) for studies and essays of various reform issues. 
2. Though the eleven states chosen for this study are not a perfect sample of all 
fifty states, they represent the various patterns of reform politics that occurred across 
the states. The three leading major reform states (Florida, Georgia, and Maryland) 
were easy to choose because they were the only ones to meet the criteria. The most 
difficult task was selecting states that had made incremental changes, the pattern that 
fit the largest number of states. We estimate that thirty-eight states fit into the incre-
mental change category. The five that were selected for this study offer a nice blend 
of key defining characteristics: size, regional location, population demographics, po-
litical characteristics, and election reform outcomes. One could have made a strong 
case for choosing several other states in the incremental change category, including 
Colorado, Indiana, Minnesota, North Carolina, Oregon, South Dakota, Texas, and 
Washington. Resource and space constraints prohibited us from including more states 
in the study. We encourage others to extend the analysis and apply the framework to 
those states. Finally, the three late-developing reform states were selected from nine 
states in this category. These states also offer a mixture of the key defining charac-
teristics we used for selecting the incremental change states. 
3. King's (1994) study of the effects of political culture on registration rules is an 
important exception to the general lack of attention to studies on the formation of 
election law. Most studies on elections at the state level have focused on campaign 
finance (see Thompson and Moncrief 1998) and (Ramsden 2002), candidate recruit-
ment (e.g., Hogan 2001), redistricting (e.g., Lublin and Voss 2000), and voting be-
havior, including the effects of ballot design (Hamilton and Ladd 1996; Schauffner, 
Streb, and Wright 2001; Wand et al. 2001), candidate status (e.g., Carey, Niemi, and 
Powell 2000; Squire 2000), early voting (Stein 1998 ; Stein and Garcia-Monent 1997), 
motor voter (e.g., Franklin and Gwen 1997; Knack 1995), party control and fiscal con-
ditions (Lowery, Alt, and Ferree 1998), and registration and voting laws (e.g., Burden 
and Greene 2000; Oliver 1996). 
4. There is an extensive literature on policy innovation, policy diffusion, and pol-
icy adoption, and the findings of those studies have been organized in a variety of 
ways. Walker's (1969) frequently cited study contains a conceptual discussion of pol-
icy innovation and a review of the early literature. For a good review of literature on 
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the various dimensions of policy diffusion and innovation studies, see Savage (1985). 
For a review of studies that account for the various determinants that explain policy 
innovation and diffusion across space and over time, see Berry and Berry 0990) and 
Berry 0994). 
5. Others might expect the opposite effect, suggesting that political competition-
measured here in terms of the closeness of the 2000 presidential election-would be 
more likely to limit election reforms. Greco (2002) argues that the more competitive 
the state, the less likely elected officials would be to take the chance of passing re-
forms that might endanger their chances for reelection. Thus, policymakers in com-
petitive states have more incentive to maintain the status quo than to adopt reforms. 
The trouble with this hypothesis is that it assumes the issues associated with election 
reform pose a major risk to incumbents or the majority party. The "rules of the game" 
certainly affect election outcome-especially rules associated with redistricting, cam-
paign finance, and voter access or ease of voting. Yet this study will show that only a 
few of the issues associated with election reform evoke partisan differences, or cause 
politicians to worry about their electoral prospects. 
6. It is worth noting the variety of registration systems and voter access laws, 
even among those states that have statewide registration databases and provisional 
ballots (see electionline.org and the Constitution Project 2001; and electionline.org 
and the Constitution Project 2002a). In some states with a statewide registration data-
base the lists may be controlled either locally or centrally. The types and ways of ad-
ministering provisional ballots vary among the thirty-seven states that have some 
form of provisional ballot. And recount procedures can be classified in several ways, 
including: whether the law has a trigger for automatic recounts, whether requests for 
recounts are permitted, who pays for the recount, whether partial recounts are per-
mitted, and whether the recount is done manually or by a machine (National Con-
ference of State Legislatures 2001a, 92-94). 
7 For a survey of residual vote rates, see Edley et al. 2002. 
8. Two states, Michigan and Florida, formed two separate commissions. For a 
complete list of states and commission reports, see www.electionline.org. 
9. For a fifty-state review of administrative coordination, see electionline.org and 
the Constitution Project (2002c). 
10. In his study of consideration and approval of school choice in the states, 
Mintrom 0997) finds that policy entrepreneurs make a difference in the diffusion of 
policy innovation. 
11 California was the only state in this group that committed funds for election 
equipment, though the funds were created through an initiative in March 2002. 
